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MORALITY
AND INTRINSIC EVIL
THOMAS A. WASSMER, S.J.*
M OST STUDENTS OF ETHICS understand early why the concept of
sin is not introduced into a course of philosophical ethics. They
know that sin is a theological term referring to a state of separation
from God by an inordinate turning to a creature. The dual formality
of an aversion from God (aversio a Deo) and a conversion or turning
inordinately to a creature (conversio ad creaturam) is recognized to
be present in every sin. The students easily understand how wrong-
doing is a turning away from good and, in some way, a turning away
from ultimate Good or God, but they raise many objections to the in-
clusion within this notion of turning away from God any reference to
offending Him, displeasing Him, or injuring Him. They have problems
with reconciling wrongdoing with injury to God. They accept this
theologically but seem to urge the detachment of the God of Deism
when they reflect on the possible consequences of their evil acts in
relation to the Divine. What possible harm to God can be done by
our wrongdoing?
They see early in philosophical ethics -that sin is a difficult term to
introduce into the course and they accept in its place the concept of
moral evil. But here, precisely, is the rub. If traditional Thomistic texts
in philosophical ethics omit the term sin and readily adopt the term
moral evil, non-Thomistic texts seem to give slight attention even to
moral evil, employ it infrequently and, in many cases, ignore it al-
together. Why is the term moral evil not used more often and con-
sidered more profoundly than it is in philosophical ethics?
Professor A.E. Taylor puts his finger on this inadequate treatment
of the problem of moral evil and says that it is the outstanding defect
of philosophical treatises on ethics. He points out that most writers
on the subject seem to think that they have done all that is expected
of them when they have tried to tell us what the good for man is, and
what virtue, or the moral law, demands of us. The concern is with a
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theory of good and little more; writers
may set before us a "theory of good and
evil" but the student will have to be satis-
fied with the perfunctory consideration
given to moral evil. The influential Prin-
cipia Ethica of G.E. Moore barely men-
tions the term. It might not be going too
far to say that, of the principal philoso-
phers who have dealt expressly and at
length with the moral life of man (in-
dependent of a theological tradition), there
are only two, Plato and Kant, whose lan-
guage reveals an acute and constant sense
of human evil. Professor Taylor denies
that this interest in the problem of moral
evil can be found in Aristotle, Descartes,
Spinoza, Leibnitz, or Hegel. He finds it
not prominent in even such vigorous sup-
porters of an "eternal and immutable"
morality as Cudworth, Clarke, and Price.
Throughout the history of moral philos-
ophy there is the paradox of a preoccu-
pation by so many thinkers with the prob-
lem of the good while reducing almost to
relative unimportance the agonizing prob-
lem of moral evil.
Just briefly let us consider once again
G.E. Moore for whom the basic problem
in ethics upon which all others depend is
the meaning of good in its intrinsic sense.
The intrinsic sense of good is the one in
which if a thing is good in that sense "it
would be a good thing that the thing
in question should exist, even if it existed
quite alone" without any further accomp-
animents or effects whatever. What then
does intrinsic good mean? The fact is that
intrinsic good cannot be defined; it is a
simple, unique, irreducible characteristic,
it can be known only immediately or in-
tuitively. The knowledge of the goodness
of a thing is directly apprehended when
the thing is known, if it is apprehended
at all. This does not mean that there is a
special faculty by which good is known,
and it does not mean that one cannot be
mistaken in judgments of value; but it
does mean that such questions as whether
or not, and to what extent, a thing is good
are in no sense subject to argument or
capable of being clarified by reasoning.
Propositions to the effect that something
is intrinsically good are not debatable:
"No relevant evidence can be adduced:
from no other truth, except from them-
selves, can it be inferred that they are
either true or false."
This is just a capsule summary of the
notion of intrinsic good to Moore. He
barely mentions evil in his Principia
Ethica but there is more than mere men-
tion of evil in the traditional Thomistic
texts on ethics. In fact, where Moore was
primarily interested in the intrinsic good,
the Thomistic ethician leads many students
to believe that his primary interest is in
moral evil and frequently in intrinsic evil.
It is here that I come to the heart of my
reflections on philosophical ethics and
moral evil. Let me put it this way. The
Thomistic moral philosopher finds it easier,
it appears, to define intrinsic evil than to
discover satisfactory examples to illustrate
the definition. It should make the moralist
reflect on whether it is not unwise to de-
nominate some moral act intrinsically evil
without fearing that he may possibly have
painted himself into a corner. To retreat
from this position requires some delicate
footwork.
This calls for some elaboration. Let me
explain why it appears to me that the term
intrinsic evil is not a viable term in moral
philosophy and why it causes more prob-
lems than it attempts to solve or even to
explain adequately. I shall try to defend
this position by considering the meaning
of "intrinsically evil" and then by ex-
amining the representative acts which are
usually designated as intrinsically evil.
An act is considered to be intrinsically
evil if, viewed just from its moral object,
prescinding from circumstances and mo-
tive, it is always in difformity with the
proximate norm which is rational human
nature. The moral object of an act is that
relationship which it bears to the norm of
morality. The object of an act is the what-
ness of the act. For example, homicide has
a different moral object than murder;
fornication has a different moral object
than adultery. If the act is regarded solely
from its object and found to be repugnant
to rational human nature (adequately con-
sidered), then such an act is characterized
as intrinsically evil. The object of most
acts, or to phrase it more precisely, most
acts, viewed just from their objects, pre-
scinding from circumstances and motive
are morally indifferent. Walking, smoking,
even killing are morally indifferent acts
considered just from their objects. It is
only when walking is done under certain
circumstances and with this or that motive
that it acquires the moral dimension of
being either morally good or morally bad.
Likewise, it is only when smoking is done
in excess by someone whose health may
become endangered that the act assumes
a moral dimension of good or bad. Inci-
dentally, this latter example provides a
rash of problems because, while smoking
in excess may involve consequences upon
physical health, there is no doubt that
it provides psychologically good conse-
quences which may well be intended to
counterbalance the possible harmful con-
sequences to physical health.
The last example cited above, of homi-
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cide, is a more interesting one to consider.
Homicide, the killing of a man-just this
act, viewed from its object-is morally in-
different. It requires the addition of several
factors to become an act morally evil.
Not every homicide is the same. Which cir-
cumstances have to be added to homicide
to constitute an act of murder? These are
circumstances that are required even to
constitute the physical integrity of the act
of murder, but what is interesting, is that
these very circumstances that change a
mere act of homicide into an act of murder
also are the circumstances that change the
moral object of indifference to a moral
object of evil. What is added to homicide
to make a case of murder? Here is where
the moral philosopher becomes even more
technical and begins to add elements that
almost inflate the original moral object of
mere homicide. What is murder for the
moralist?
Murder for many moralists is unjust
killing of another man. What really does
this mean? When spelled out it becomes
this expanded definition which, as John
Hospers says, dilutes the original moral
rule "do not kill" almost into a tautology.
This is the articulated meaning for unjust
killing or murder: the direct killing of an-
other man on one's own authority outside
a case of legitimate self-defense. Direct
killing refers to the act of killing intended
as an end or as a means to an end and on
one's own authority means that one is ex-
ercising right over another person's life
which he does not have. By the inclusion
of self-defense within the definition, the
definer surely wants to exclude from mur-
der the act of killing the assailant. But
what happens if someone considers it just
for a society to exercise capital punish-
ment? In order to exclude capital punish-
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ment as an act of murder when the criminal
is killed, does this not compel the advocate
of the above definition to include this ex-
ception? Murder then assumes this defini-
tion: the direct killing of another man on
one's own authority outside a case of le-
gitimate self-defense and capital punish-
ment. If anyone wants to designate this
moral act with its expanded, articulated
object, an act morally wrong, he will re-
ceive wide acceptance in western society.
However, suppose this definition is of-
fered to the pacifist who takes the moral
rule not to kill literally; suppose it is sub-
mitted to the Hindu who extends the pro-
hibition against -taking life to all forms of
life; suppose is it submitted to Dr. Schwei-
tzer?
Now, I do not quarrel with the fact that
there is general acceptance in many quar-
ters of the definition of murder. What I
do suggest is that murder has been so de-
fined that it excludes everything that we
regard as not exercises of murder and it
is here that some moralists with one con-
stellation of values will add or subtract
cases and other moralists with a different
constellation of values will add or sub-
tract other cases. If then, for us, murder
is defined as it was above-direct killing of
another man on one's own authority out-
side a case of legitimate self-defense and
capital punishment - and if this act of
murder is then considered to be merely
evil from its object, intrinsically evil from
its object, just how viable has this notion
of intrinsically evil become? Viable for all
who accept, but not viable for those who
dissent from, our own constellation of
values, our own value system.
This speculation on the problems that
arise from any designation of an act to be
intrinsically evil can be extended to in-
clude a consideration of similar problems
in the cases of suicide, lying, and steriliza-
tion. It seems to lead to the conclusion
that the moral philosopher must struggle
to develop the most authentic meaning for
murder, suicide, lying and sterilization, but
after he has constructed such a moral act,
he should be very hesitant to designate it
as intrinsically evil. Why is this so? Be-
cause by characterizing this act with all of
its qualifications as intrinsically evil, he
has little ground on which to move unless
he is willing to re-examine each of the
qualifications and admit that the definition
is malleable. The problem with the person
who readily designates an act to be in-
trinsically evil is that he will tolerate very
little modification within the definition of
the moral act as he proposes it. In fact,
does not the very term intrinsic evil seem to
imply that modifications are not in order?
However, any student of the history of
ethics knows well that modifications are
very much in order arising from a more
penetrating knowledge of human nature
and the complexities of the human act.
An examination of most texts in ethics
will reveal a general reluctance to refer to
any act as intrinsically evil. Most books
mention blasphemy and stop there; others
dishonesty, infidelity and dishonor, but
these latter are really dodging the issue
because they do not specify the very moral
act which is an act of dishonesty, infidelity
or dishonor. Any moral act can be built
up into something approaching the notion
of intrinsic evil if we construct upon the
simple moral object of the act a variety
of circumstances and motives which will
alter its moral species from moral indiffer-
ence to moral evil. But how far does this
construction have to go before we are sure
(Continued on page 236)
Orthodox Jewish denominational schools
said yesterday they welcomed the state's
interpretation of the use of federal school
funds.
Msgr. Raymond P. Rigney, superin-
tendent of Catholic schools for the Arch-
diocese of New York, called the ruling
''very encouraging." "We do hope that
we can cooperate to achieve the aims of
this education act for all the children of
this city," he said.
No immediate comment was available
from public school officials.
Moses I. Feuerstein, president of the
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that the moral -act is intrinsically evil?
Take sterilization as a further example.
Sterilization in itself is morally indifferent;
indirect therapeutic sterilization in the
presence of a pathological disorder is
morally good; direct punitive sterilization
would be acceptable to anyone who ac-
cepts the De Lugo position on the law-
fulness of direct killing of an aggressor in
the case of legitimate self-defense. If the
De Lugo position warrants direct killing of
a criminal in these circumstances, then a
fortiori, direct sterilization of a criminal
can be allowed because to intend directly
the death of the man himself is something
more serious than to intend directly the
mutilation of his generative system. The
further problem with the moral dimen-
sion of sterilization is the formidable ques-
tion involved in the controversy over the
anovulants: if the anovulant results in a
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Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations
of America, said that "the Orthodox Jew-
ish community welcomes this ruling be-
cause under it the greatest possible bene-
fits of the federal education act will be
made available without discrimination to
the maximum number of children, re-
gardless of their school affiliation."
Among the groups that have opposed
the provisions of the act permitting federal
aid to church-related schools, the Ameri-
can Jewish Congress has said it would test
the constitutionality of the program in the
courts.
sterilization (temporary), may such a
sterilization be directly intended in the ab-
sence of a pathological condition such as
menorrhagia, dysmenorrhea, or an irregu-
lar menstrual cycle? In other words, may
this kind of sterilization be intended as a
means for the further good of marital in-
timacy and in the presence of serious psy-
chological reasons? To say that direct
sterilization is always wrong, to say that
indirect sterilization is licit only in the
presence of a physical pathological condi-
tion, is to narrow the area of moral dia-
logue.
More can be said and should be said
about the non-viability of the concept of
intrinsic evil. It is hoped that these reflec-
tions will stimulate some further discus-
sion on the problem of moral evil in gen-
eral and on the prudent unwillingness to
characterize any moral act as intrinsically
evil. "Intrinsically evil," applied too
freely, can place an albatross around the
neck of the user.
